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Contrary to popular arguments about “echo 
chambers” and “filter bubbles,” evidence shows that 
social media tend to promote exposure to political 
disagreement. But if this disagreement has little to 
no effect on individuals’ attitudes and opinions, the 
democratic benefits of this increased exposure could 
be limited. This study empirically investigates 
whether exposure to political disagreement in social 
media versus face-to-face settings has differential 
effects on individuals’ uncertainty about their 
political opinions and beliefs. In doing so, the paper 
accounts for the interplay between these two 
settings in terms of news use and political 
discussion. The results show (a) differences in the 
relationship between political disagreement and 
uncertainty in social media versus face-to-face 
settings and (b) considerable overlap in discussion 
and reflection processes between these two settings. 
Results are discussed in light of ongoing 
conversations about the democratic benefits of 
political disagreement. 
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he 2019 Brexit deal has generated uncertainty among citizens of the U.K. and 
among people around the world, and discussion about Brexit seems to create 
more uncertainty about the future, not less (Silva, 2019). Dynamic political 
discussion about this and other contentious issues, including but certainly not 
limited to nuclear disarmament in North Korea, populist movements in the United States 
and several European countries, and the diplomatic status of Jerusalem, may motivate 
individuals to seek more accurate political information and to learn about diverse political 
views in both online and in-person settings (Brundidge, 2010; Eveland & Hively, 2009). 
However, doing so could also generate uncertainty about prior political views, especially 
T 
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when people habitually encounter disagreement about the subject (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & 
Sprague, 2004). Based on this logic, it is important to examine whether and how opinion 
uncertainty is related to political disagreement and political discussion, and, given the 
proliferation of online communication platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, how this 
relationship may differ across communication settings.  
Attitude uncertainty and ambivalence have been linked to a variety of outcomes 
that are widely considered to be positive from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, 
including systematic message processing (Petty & Wegener, 1998), cognitive elaboration 
(Cooper & Fazio, 1984), engagement with “cross-cutting” views (Festinger, 1957; Huckfeldt 
et al., 2004), and tolerance of others’ political views (Mutz, 2002; 2006; Price, Cappella, & 
Nir, 2002). Political disagreement, in particular, has the potential to make people more 
uncertain or ambivalent about their own political opinions and beliefs (Knobloch, 
Satterlee, & DiDomenico, 2010; Kuang & Wilson, 2017), which is one of the primary 
reasons that exposure to disagreement is widely celebrated as the lynchpin for any truly 
deliberative sphere (e.g., Mansbridge, 1999).   
Prior research has established that both social media and face-to-face settings are 
important venues for political discussion and interaction—and, more specifically, political 
disagreement—in the emerging media environment (Barnidge, 2017; Brundidge, 2010; Gil 
de Zúñiga, Bachmann, Hsu, & Brundidge, 2013; Valenzuela, 2009; Valenzuela, Arriagada, 
& Scherman, 2012). However, research has not addressed whether disagreement in these 
venues has equivalent effects on individual’s uncertainty about their political opinions and 
beliefs, nor has it considered the overlapping layers of influence that communication in 
these various settings may exert. 
The purpose of this study is to explore how individuals’ uncertainty about their own 
political views increases in relation to various communication practices in both social 
media and face-to-face settings. In doing so, the study compares communicative processes 
in social media and face-to-face settings, but it also considers them to be interwoven and 
overlapping. Prior research shows that there is a substantial degree of overlap between 
communication practices in these environments, such that communication in one arena 
can lead to subsequent communication or action in the other (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & 
Kwak, 2005). Therefore, we also expand the scope of the literature on disagreement and 
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uncertainty by examining this interplay between news use, political talk, and political 
disagreement in social media and face-to-face settings. Relying on a national survey of 
adult internet users in the United States, we employ structural equation modeling 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) to investigate the effects of political disagreement in social 
media and in face-to-face settings on uncertainty and to develop a model of the interplay 
between online and offline settings. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is an acute psychological state (Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 2000) 
characterized by doubtfulness or a lack of strong belief (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & 
Haslam, 1993). Uncertainty is relatively common where information is inconsistent or 
conflicting (Babrow, Kasch, & Ford, 1998; Brashers, 2001). Two theories offer explanations 
for the relationship between inconsistent information and uncertainty: cognitive 
dissonance theory and social identity theory. According to cognitive dissonance theory, 
individuals prefer harmony in inner attitudes or beliefs. Incongruence in interpersonal 
communication produces psychological discomfort, which can lead to uncertainty about 
attitudes or beliefs (Festinger, 1957, 1962). For example, when individuals encounter 
dissonant perspectives, they try to resolve their uncertainty by seeking more information 
that confirms their previously held beliefs (Kuang & Wilson, 2017; Maurer & Holbach, 
2016).  
According to social identity theory, group membership is related to a number of 
personal characteristics, such as personal competence, talent, and social ability (Tajfel, 
1982). In addition, individuals are more likely to accommodate in-group norms and values 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Tajfel, 1982). Accordingly, those who become used to in-group 
information tend to not believe information forwarded by out-group members (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). In other words, individuals categorize 
themselves according to an increasingly isomorphic prototype derived from sharing group 
beliefs, values, and norms with intragroup members. For example, research has found 
that exposure to perspectives of out-group members is related to information seeking in an 
effort to reduce uncertainty (Kuang & Wilson, 2017; Maurer & Holbach, 2016). However, 
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those who adhere to shared group norms with in-group members feel cognitive dissonance 
when encountering dissonant perspectives from others (Hogg & Reid, 2006), which 
increases uncertainty toward different political views.   
Political Disagreement and Uncertainty 
Political disagreement is an interaction or communication with those who disagree 
or who hold incongruent political perspectives (Barnidge, 2017; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & 
Sprague, 2004), and, because uncertainty is largely created by inconsistent or incongruent 
information, the incongruity resulting from exposure to political disagreement could lead 
to uncertainty (or ambivalence) about one’s political opinions or beliefs (Huckfeldt, 
Johnson, et al., 2004; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Stroud, 2010).   
Face-to-face political talk networks are typically characterized by perceived 
closeness, liking, and a tendency toward political similarity (Barnidge, 2018; Kandel, 
1978). In these conditions, the strength of prototypical in-group image is enhanced 
through the adoption of shared group norms (see Hogg & Reid, 2006). Social norms 
typically discourage political disagreement in face-to-face settings, as most people prefer 
agreeable conversations and expressing disagreement in the wrong contexts could be 
considered inappropriate (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002; MacKuen, 1990). And while 
some social settings such as school, church, and volunteer groups encourage interactions 
that expose individuals to a greater diversity of perspectives than they would otherwise 
find at home among family members, friends/acquaintances, and neighbors (Huckfeldt & 
Sprague, 1995), disagreement in face-to-face settings is relatively uncommon (Conover et 
al., 2002; Mutz, 2006; Walsh, 2004).  
Research shows that social media and other online media technologies largely 
increase the amount of disagreement to which individuals are exposed in comparison to 
face-to-face settings, because they provide a venue for flexible and horizontal 
communication, they transcend geographical boundaries, and they increase inadvertent 
exposure to heterogeneous information (Barnidge, 2017; Bimber, 2008; Brundidge, 2010; 
Kim, Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013; Valenzuela et al., 2012). Despite the fact that social 
media probably facilitate exposure to political disagreement, there is good reason to 
believe that disagreement in face-to-face settings has a bigger effect on people’s political 
opinions and beliefs via uncertainty. Individuals largely avoid disagreement in these 
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settings because it makes them uncomfortable (Conover et al., 2002; Eliasoph, 1998; 
Walsh, 2004) and they are reminded of various social cross-pressures (Mutz, 2006; Rojas, 
2015). But when disagreement does occur, these cross-pressures can result in ambivalence 
or political disengagement (Mutz, 2006) as people decrease the importance of politics in an 
effort to maintain their social relationships. Because political conversations typically occur 
among people closer in terms of social distance (Conover et al., 2002; Kandel, 1978), people 
tend to value these relationship over “winning” arguments, and therefore disagreement in 
face-to-face settings may create a good deal of uncertainty as people question their 
opinions or beliefs in an effort to maintain consistency with their social contacts. 
By contrast, political discussion on social media typically occurs among individuals 
who are more socially distant (Ellison, Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011). Social 
media promotes the expansion of social networks (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; 
Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009), and therefore social media networks are characterized by 
more weak ties than face-to-face networks (Barnidge, 2015, 2017; Ellison et al., 2011). 
Because people are more socially distant to these ties, the effects of disagreement with 
them may be diminished when compared to disagreement in face-to-face settings, 
particularly if disagreement is uncivil (Gil de Zúñiga, Barnidge, & Diehl, 2018).  
Political Disagreement, Political Talk, and News Use 
Political disagreement depends on to which degree individuals engage in political 
talk and seek political news (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; 
McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). Research shows political discussion mediates the 
relationship between news use and political disagreement (Cho et al., 2009; Lee et al., 
2014; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). The communication mediation model 
emphasizes the positive connection between informational uses of news media to 
participatory behaviors via talk/discussion (McLeod et al., 2001; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et 
al., 2007; Shah et al., 2017). According to the logic of the model, political talk positively 
mediates the relationship between news use and political disagreement (Jung, Kim, & Gil 
de Zúniga, 2011; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Shah et al., 
2007). Interpersonal communication in online communication environments facilitates 
these mediated processes as much as face-to-face interactions (Barnidge, 2017). Thus, 
political discussion in both the online and offline worlds mediates the relationship between 
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political talk and “downstream” outcomes such as exposure to political disagreement 
(Barnidge, 2015; Hong & Rojas, 2016). 
The communication mediation model also suggests that there is considerable 
overlap between the online and offline worlds, such that interpersonal communication in 
one setting tends to influence interpersonal communication in the other (Shah et al., 
2007). The ubiquitous and interactive technology features of digital media allow 
individuals to engage in both online and offline communication environments (Barnidge, 
2015, 2017; Brundidge, 2010; Park, 2015). Research shows that interpersonal 
communication in online environments is related to offline action (Jung et al., 2011; Kim 
et al., 2013) and also that communication in offline environments is related to online 
action (Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). Therefore, the processes of interpersonal 
communication and reflection described in the communication mediation model permeates 
across communicative settings.  
Theoretical Model 
Figure 1 presents the theoretical model of the current study. Based on the logic of 
cognitive dissonance and social identity theory, the proposed theoretical model predicts 
that political disagreement in social media and face-to-face settings will be positively 
associated with uncertainty (β7 – β8). In addition, the theoretical foundations of the 
communication mediation model lead us to expect that there will be substantial overlaps 
between political disagreement and political talk in social media and face-to-face settings 
(β1 through β4). Lastly, and in accordance with prior research (e.g., Barnidge, 2015; 
McLeod et al., 2001; Shah et al., 2005), the model predicts that news use will be positively 
associated with engaging in political talk in both social media and face-to-face settings (γ1 
through γ4). Based upon existing communication theoretical frameworks, therefore, we 
attempt to identify substantial paths mechanisms between news use and uncertainty. 
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Figure 1. Expected relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables.  
 
METHODS 
Data  
Data were collected between March 26 and March 29, 2015 using an online survey 
panel administered by a private company, Survey Sampling International (SSI). The 
sample was designed to reflect the population of adult (age 18+) Internet users in the 
United States. SSI used a three-stage sampling process. First, subjects were randomly 
selected from an online panel constructed by SSI using geographic and demographic 
quotas based on age, gender, education, income, and place of residence, in such a way that 
they are comparable to the U.S. Census statistics for the population of interest. Next, 
subjects were randomly presented with screening questions asking whether respondents 
are over the age of 18, whether they are U.S. residents, and whether they had Internet 
access, in order to determine their eligibility for the study. Finally, subjects were 
randomly invited to take the study based on their likelihood to complete it based on their 
past completion of surveys. This final step is taken to maximize the likelihood of obtaining 
complete responses. The cleaned data set contained 649 complete responses (American 
Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) RR3 = 32.7%), and missing cases were 
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deleted listwise for a final N of 496. The sample reflects the U.S. adult population in terms 
of social media use (76% in the current sample versus 74% in a recent Pew sample; see 
Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015). About two-thirds of the sample is 
female (67%), reflecting recent reports that more females use social media than males (see 
Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). The sample tracks closely with U.S. Census 
population demographics for age (M = 47.52, SD = 16.59), education (35% bachelor’s 
degree; average respondent [M = 3.94, SD = 1.60] has completed some college or associate’s 
degree work), and income (average [M = 2.67, SD = 1.53] between $35,000 and $75,000 per 
year). 
Endogenous Variables  
Uncertainty. Drawing from prior research on uncertainty (e.g., Knobloch et al., 
2010; Knobloch & Solomon, 1999), our uncertainty measures rely on four survey items 
asking respondents about their (a) certainty and (b) confidence they have in their political 
opinions when (1) an exert or (2) a close friend disagrees with them (0 = “Strongly 
Disagree,” 4 = “Strongly Agree”). To construct the final variable, these four items were 
averaged and the scores were reversed (Cronbach’s α = .68, M = 2.32, SD = .73). 
Social media political disagreement. Respondents completed three questionnaire 
items asking about the frequency with which they encounter disagreement in social media 
settings about (a) politics or elections, (b) news or current events, and (c) public or 
community issues (0 = “Never” and 5 = “Frequently”) (see Barnidge, 2017; Kim et al., 
2013; Lu, Heatherly, & Lee, 2016). The final variable took the pairwise mean (Cronbach’s 
α = .93, M = 2.00, SD = 1.60)  
Face-to-face political disagreement. Drawing from prior measures of political 
disagreement (e.g., Barnidge, 2017), respondents were asked three questionnaire items 
asking about the frequency with which they encounter political disagreement in face-to-
face settings, and the items were averaged pairwise to create the final variable 
(Cronbach’s α = .91, M = 2.09, SD = 1.33). 
Social media political talk. Social media political talk was measured using 16 
questionnaire items about the (a) number of people (max = 200) and (b) frequency (0 = 
“Never” and 4 = “Very often”) with which they discuss politics on social media with four 
categories of people: (a) family members, (b) friends, (c) coworkers or classmates, and (d) 
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other acquaintances on (a) Facebook and (b) Twitter (e.g., Brundidge, 2010; Kim et al., 
2013). The number of people was multiplied by the frequency of talk within each category 
(for Facebook, .17 < r < .26 and for Twitter, .24 < r < .44), then averaged pairwise across 
media so that like categories were combined (.34 < r < .88), and then finally averaged 
pairwise across categories (.38 < r < .76; M = 14.58, SD = 45.43).  
Face-to-face political talk. Drawing from prior measures for political discussion 
(Barnidge, 2017; Eveland & Hively, 2009), face-to-face political talk variable mimicked the 
method used for social media political talk, with the exception that it only includes one 
medium (whereas the social media variable measured messaging on both Facebook and 
Twitter) and therefore uses eight items instead of 16. Once again, network size and 
frequency were multiplied within social tie categories (.16 < r < .35). These scores were 
then averaged pairwise (.21 < r < .51; M = 16.68, SD = 32.23).  
Exogenous Variables  
Social media news use. Based on previous research (see also, Barnidge, 2015; Kim 
et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014), social media news use was measured with four items—two 
apiece for Facebook and Twitter, respectively—asking (a) how many days in the past week 
respondents read news or political commentary and (b) how much attention they paid 
when they did (0 = “Not at all” and 5 = “A great deal”; see Eveland, Hutchens, & Shen, 
2009)  to combine dimensions of news use (i.e., exposure and attention) within specific 
media. Reception of these items was filtered based on social media use. For example, 
respondents who indicated they do not use Twitter did not receive any subsequent items 
asking about Twitter. Respondents who do not use social media (about 24%) skipped these 
items entirely. The items exhibited moderately strong inter-medium correlations (for 
Facebook, r = .50 and for Twitter, r = .73). The items were multiplied within media and 
then averaged across media (M = 7.62, SD = 9.92).  
Non-social media news use. Also based on the recommendations of Eveland and 
colleagues (2009), the survey asked respondents how many days in the past week they 
watched, read, or listened to news (a) online (excluding social media), (b) on television, and 
(c) in newspapers. Respondents who answered more than zero were asked how much 
attention they paid to that news (0 = “Not at all” and 5 = “A great deal”). Items were 
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multiplied within media (for online, r = .55, for television, r = .60, and for newspapers, r = 
.53) and then averaged to obtain the final measure (M = 11.13, SD = 8.33).  
Control Variables  
Social media use. Social media use was measured with four items per medium that 
asked respondents to first indicate how many days per week they used (a) Facebook and 
(b) Twitter, and to then indicate how many times per day (0 = “Never” and 6 = “More than 
several times a day”) they check (a) Facebook and (b) Twitter. Within-medium correlations 
for these items were strong (r = .91 for both Facebook and Twitter). Therefore, the items 
were multiplied within media before the products were averaged across media (M = 15.80, 
SD = 10.40).  
Political knowledge. Political knowledge was measured with four items. Scores were 
coded as either right (1) or wrong (0; category includes “Don’t know” answers) and added 
together (M = 2.23, SD = 1.15).  
Political interest. Political interest was measured with two questionnaire items 
asking respondents how interested they are in local or regional politics and national 
politics (0 = “Not at all” and 5 = “Very”). These items were averaged (r = .78, M = 2.96, SD 
= 1.45).  
Political efficacy. Political efficacy was measured with two items taken from the 
classic political science scale. These two items were highly correlated (r = .78) and 
therefore averaged (M = 2.06, SD = 1.11).  
Strength of partisanship. Strength of partisanship was constructed using two 
survey items. The first asked which party respondents identified with (Green, Democratic, 
Republican, Libertarian), and the second asked how strong that identification is (1 = “Not 
that strong” and 2 = “Strong”). Respondents who did not identify with a party received a 
score of 0 on the final variable, while the strength of partisanship score was taken for 
those who did identify with a party (M = 1.30, SD = 0.73), resulting in a 3-point scale 
where 0 = non-identifier, 1 = weak identifier, and 2 = strong identifier.  
Ideological extremity. Strength of political ideology used standard measures, which 
asked respondents to place themselves on an 11-point scale where 0 = Liberal and 10 = 
Conservative. This item was recoded with 0 at the midpoint. The absolute value was then 
taken as the final measure (M = 0.08, SD = 2.67).  
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Demographics. Analyses also controlled for gender (1 = Female), age, education (0 = 
“None” and 7 = “Postgraduate degree”), and annual household income (0 = Less than 
$15,000 and 6 = $150,000 or more). See earlier discussion for descriptive statistics.  
Analysis  
A path analysis was used to test the theorized relationships depicted in Figure 1 
with the correlation matrix in Table 1. Before performing the path analysis, the 
endogenous variables were residualized on the control variables, including demographics 
(age, gender, income, education), political orientation (political internal efficacy, interest, 
strength of political ideology, political knowledge), and general social media use.  
 
Table 1  
Correlations of antecedent and consequence endogenous variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Social media news use 1 - - - - - - 
2 Non-social media news use .24** 1 - - - - - 
3 Social media talk .18** .14** 1 - - - - 
4 Face-to-face talk .09 .14** .40** 1 - - - 
5 Social media disagreement .17** .08 .15** .18** 1 - - 
6 Face-to-face disagreement .05 .03 .06 .16** .43** 1 - 
7 Uncertainty  .07 .09* .01 .01 .12** .13** 1 
Note. ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overall, the model was a good fit to the data. The chi-square value was non-
significant (2 (2) = .007, p = .593), and both chi-square-based indices (GFI = .999, CFI = 
1.00, TLI = 1.00) and error-based indices (RMSEA = .00, p = .843; SRMR = .005) also 
indicated a good model fit according to standard criteria (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). In 
terms of explanatory value, the model produced R2 values of .043 for social media political 
talk, .023 for face-to-face political talk, .056 for social media disagreement, .027 for face-to-
face disagreement, and .039 for uncertainty. Because the data analysis of this study is 
based on cross-sectional data, we compared the model with alternative path models1. The 
proposed model outperformed all alternatives. 
 
1 Three alternative models were tested to assess the validity of the proposed research model of the present 
research. The first alternative model (social media news use, social media talk, non-social media talk, and 
face-to-face talk → social media and face-to face disagreement → uncertainty) indicates x2 (4) = .0214, CFI 
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Figure 2. Path model of social media news/non-social media news use on uncertainty 
Note: Standardized path coefficients are displayed; Number of observations = 496; age, 
gender, house hold income, education, political interest, internal political efficacy, strength 
of ideology, political partisanship, political knowledge, and general social media use were 
controlled in the path model; ** p < .05; *** p <.001. 
 
Figure 2 presents standardized coefficients and error terms for the path analysis. 
The key finding is that face-to-face disagreement was significantly and positively related 
to uncertainty (β = .10, p <.05), while social media disagreement, on the other hand, was 
not significantly related (β = .06, n.s.). Thus, the results indicate that disagreeing with 
someone in face-to-face settings is more strongly related to uncertainty than disagreeing 
with someone in social media settings.  
However, the model also shows an indirect path between social media disagreement 
and uncertainty via face-to-face disagreement. The two disagreement variables are, in 
fact, positively and strongly related (β = .42, p < .05), which means that the indirect path 
from social media disagreement to uncertainty via face-to-face disagreement is 
approximately as strong as the direct path from face-to-face disagreement to uncertainty 
 
=0.987, GFI = .0992, RMSEA = .030, SRMR = .021, and TLI = .952. The second alternative model (face-to-
face talk [influenced by other exogenous variables] → face-to-face disagreement [by other exogenous 
variables] → uncertainty) shows x2 (1) = .027, CFI =0.985, GFI = .0994, RMSEA = .088, SRMR = .017, and 
TLI = .781. Lastly, the third alternative model (social media talk [by other exogenous variables] → social 
media disagreement [by other exogenous variables] → uncertainty) indicates x2 (1) = .611, CFI =1.00, GFI = 
1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .004, and TLI = 1.038.  
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(β = .10, p < .05). Thus, social media disagreement is related to uncertainty, but not 
directly. Other relationships estimated by the model also reveal similar online-to-offline 
pathways. For example, social media political talk is positively related to disagreement in 
both settings via its direct relationship with face-to-face talk (β = .39, p < .05). Calculations 
reveal the indirect effect of social media talk on face-to-face disagreement at 
approximately β = .11 (p < .05).  
The political talk variables themselves are positively predicted by the news use 
variables. Social media political talk is predicted by news use both on social media (γ = .15, 
p < .05) and elsewhere (γ = .11, p < .05). Face-to-face political talk, on the other hand, is 
only predicted by non-social media news use (γ = .13, p < .05). However, political talk on 
social media and face-to-face are positively related to one another (β = .39, p < .05), 
indicating substantial communicative linkage between news use and political talk in social 
media and face-to-face settings.  
 
DISCUSSION 
To briefly summarize the results, political disagreement in face-to-face settings is 
significantly and positively related to uncertainty, but political disagreement in social 
media settings is not significantly related to uncertainty. Second, face-to-face talk has a 
positive influence on political disagreement in both social media and face-to-face settings. 
Third, social media news use is positively related to political talk in social media settings. 
Finally, non-social media news use is positively related to political talk in both social 
media and face-to-face settings.  
The findings point toward two specific conclusions. First, political disagreement in 
different settings may not have the same impact on uncertainty. Specifically, face-to-face 
disagreement has a stronger relationship with uncertainty than social media 
disagreement. Second, and consistent with previous research on the communication 
mediation model (McLeod et al., 2001; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007; Shah et al., 
2017), processes related to news use and discussion in online and offline settings display a 
substantial degree of overlap.   
By extension, these conclusions imply that although political disagreement is more 
common in social media settings than in face-to-face settings (Barnidge, 2017), 
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disagreement in the latter setting may lead to more pro-democratic outcomes than 
disagreement in the latter. For example, political disagreement is positively related to 
political tolerance of the other side (Mutz, 2006), largely because it promotes ambivalence 
(which is closely related to uncertainty) about individuals’ attitudes and beliefs. And while 
exposure to political disagreement in face-to-face settings may be less common than in 
social media settings (Barnidge, 2017), it may also be more likely to increase tolerance 
because it has a stronger relationship with uncertainty. More specifically, stronger 
relationship shown in face-to-face communication settings than social media settings could 
reduce psychological distance among discussants with increasing levels of interpersonal 
intimacy and social tie (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Though political discussions in face-to-
face require high level of political tolerance among discussants, individuals’ perception of 
disagreement for the sake of consistency could generate conjectural distances to become 
suspicious of a political information on whether it is likely or unlikely. On the other hand, 
perception of political disagreement in social media settings constructed with relatively 
weak-tie relationships might have lesser impacts on uncertainty about existing political 
information and rationales of the discussants because they might not easily trust the other 
side of disagreeing view or avoid dissimilar points of views instantly. Future research 
could extend these findings to examine the links between disagreement, uncertainty, and 
tolerance in face-to-face versus social media settings.  
In a related vein, interpersonal communication in face-to-face settings may be more 
likely to reduce intergroup prejudice than communication in social media settings. The 
uncertainty created by political disagreement in these settings may reduce the tendency to 
self-categorize oneself into an in-group and the discussant into an outgroup (Tajfel, 1982). 
By contrast, because social media disagreement takes place with more socially distant ties 
from the comfort of a computer screen, this very normal tendency to categorize individuals 
into opposing social groups may not be reduced. In as much as social identification and 
self-categorization leads to intergroup discrimination (Tajfel, 1982), this implies that face-
to-face communication could be more influential in terms of reducing discrimination in a 
democratically beneficial way. 
That said, these findings also show substantial overlap between interpersonal 
communication processes in face-to-face and social media settings, implying that 
Kim & Barnidge 
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communication in one setting can influence communication in another (see also, Shah et 
al., 2005; Shah et al, 2007). Therefore, even while political disagreement in social media 
settings may have less of an influence on uncertainty than disagreement in face-to-face 
settings, individuals may carry that disagreement forward into face-to-face conversation, 
which could lead to disagreement and, subsequently, to uncertainty of one’s own beliefs 
and tolerance of the other side. More research is needed to elaborate on the overlap in 
these processes, and future research should focus on examining whether political 
disagreement in social media settings has an influence on political conversation in other 
settings.   
The conclusions of this study are limited in several important ways. First, the study 
relies on self-reported measures of the endogenous variables rather than actual 
observation. While this problem is typical of survey research, self-reported measures are 
prone to measurement error, and future research could collect and analyze observational 
data to complement these findings. In a related vein, the disagreement measure relies on 
the perception of the respondent, and future research could assess discrepancies between 
those perceptions and reality, as judged by an external observer. Third, the study does not 
measure political disagreement separately on Facebook and Twitter. Future research 
could investigate the differences between these prominent social media platforms. Finally, 
this study is cross-sectional, presenting a set of relationships that are ordered by theory. 
However, causal inferences cannot be made from these data, and future research should 
assess causality using an over-time experimental or survey design. 
Despite the above limitations, the present study delineates the core logics of the 
communication mediation model, highlighting the overlapping process of interpersonal 
communication across communicative settings. Furthermore, the study shows different 
patterns of relationships between disagreement and uncertainty in social media versus 
face-to-face settings. With the development of new media technologies, the findings of the 
current study contribute to the ongoing conversations about the benefits of political 
disagreement for democratic societies. 
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